{"id":2261,"date":"2016-01-21T22:14:55","date_gmt":"2016-01-21T15:14:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/?p=2261"},"modified":"2017-04-01T06:28:36","modified_gmt":"2017-03-31T23:28:36","slug":"stbi-21-01-2016-self-enforcing-intergenerational-social-contract-as-a-source-of-pareto-improvement-and-emission-mitigation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/vi\/stbi-21-01-2016-self-enforcing-intergenerational-social-contract-as-a-source-of-pareto-improvement-and-emission-mitigation\/","title":{"rendered":"[STBI-21-01-2016] Self-enforcing Intergenerational social contract as a source of Pareto improvement and Emission mitigation"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>by\u00a0Dr. Nguyen Thang Dao<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">11:00 am, Thursday, 21-01-2016<br \/>\nHall H.001, Dubai Palace School of Economics<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">We consider, in a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with environmental externalities, a contract between successive generations, whereby agents of the current working- age generation privately invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer to their old-age capital income paid by the next generation. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto-improving compared to an equilibrium without contract requires a minimum level of income and we characterize the set of Pareto-improving mitigation-transfer combinations as well as the Pareto frontier. Nash bargaining yields unique solutions for the mitigation share and transfer rate respectively which increase in income. We prove that Nash bargaining leads to a steady state with lower emission stock and higher income compared to the steady state without a contract and we study transitional dynamics. Notably, simulation shows that delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long may have considerable welfare costs: Income inevitably falls below the threshold in \u00a0nite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high emission stock and low income. In the second part of the paper, we study a non-cooperative setting, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from the provisions of the contract. Incentive compatible Nash bargaining leads to a lower mitigation investment and transfer than bargaining in the cooperative setting.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Presenter<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Dr. Nguyen Thang Dao\u00a0is working for\u00a0Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC)\u00a0in Berlin, Germany as a research fellow. Dr. Dao completed his Ph.D in Economics in September 2013 at CORE, Universit\u00e9 catholique de Louvain. His fields of research cover Growth Theories, Climate Change, Environmental Economics, Comparative Development, and Public Economics which are studied in micro-foundation macroeconomic models. Dr. Dao has published his research studies on academic journals such as\u00a0Cliometrica: Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Economics Letters,\u00a0and\u00a0Journal of Science: Economics and Business.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"by\u00a0Dr. Nguyen Thang Dao 11:00 am, Thursday, 21-01-2016 Hall H.001, Dubai Palace School of Economics Abstract We consider, in a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with environmental externalities, a contract between successive generations, whereby agents of the current working- age generation privately invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[188],"tags":[],"acf":[],"lang":"vi","translations":{"vi":2261,"en":2946},"pll_sync_post":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2261"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2261"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2261\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2313,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2261\/revisions\/2313"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2261"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2261"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/se.dotv.vn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2261"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}